kn. 1. Predystorii͡a, zasedanii͡a -- kn. 2. Khronika, portrety.

Для студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей и исследователей, специализирующихся в области философии и логики, истории русской философии.

The Concept of a Phenomenon ANTHONY QUINTON In British philosophy 'phenomenon' usually means 'sensory appearance'. Yet until Wittgenstein and Ryle standard..

One of the major problems in contemporary philosophy of mind is the dualism of first-person and third-person perspectives — the question of whether conscious experience is public and epistemically accessible or private and qualitative. Recognising the relevance of the arguments of both sides, naturalists and anti-naturalists, I attempt to resolve this dichotomy using Bruno Latour’s methodology on the theories of Immanuel Kant and Moritz Schlick. To do so, I propose not to reduce the theory of consciousness to one interpretation, but (...) to consider conscious experience as a “boundary object” between the spheres of the private and the public, the accessible and the qualitative, the unique and the reproducible. Through the “practice of translation” I demonstrate the failure of ontologies of conscious experience proposed by both naturalism and anti-naturalism, and propose an “intersectional theory” as an alternative theory of conscious experience that affirms, on the one hand, the uniqueness of the individual’s epistemic position and, on the other hand, its reproducibility and communicability. I introduce the term “intersectional locality” to denote the ontological status of conscious experience. In the next step, I return to the necessary (according to Latour) “practice of purification” of those epistemic zones whose fusion was outlined earlier, which allows me to recognise the intuition behind the dichotomy of the two perspectives as legitimate and requiring conceptualisation. The mediation of Schlick’s positivist theory and Kant’s transcendentalist theory allows us to present first-person and third-person perspectives as two epistemic registers, subordinated to the position of a historically specific conscious subject. I treat the first-person perspective as a reflective power of judgment, and the third-person perspective as a determinative power of judgment; doing so, I establish the connection between the qualitative interpretation of phenomenal experience and the aesthetic principle of the reflective power of judgment. I conclude that conscious experience as a subject matter of research is a hybrid object, and only the project of “nonmodern” science will make it possible to create a relevant theory of consciousness that does not resort to reduction. (shrink)

Ernest Gellner was a unique scholar whose work covered areas as diverse as social anthropology, analytical philosophy, the sociology of the Islamic world, nationalism, psychoanalysis, East European transformations and kinship structures. Despite this diversity, there is an exceptional degree of unity and coherence in Gellner's work with his distinctly modernist, rationalist and liberal world-view evident in everything he wrote. His central problematic remains constant: understanding how the modern world came into being and to what extent it is unique relative to (...) all other social forms. Ten years after his death, this book brings together leading social theorists to evaluate the significance of Gellner's legacy and to re-examine his central concerns. It corrects many misunderstandings and critically engages with Gellner's legacy to provide a cutting edge contribution to understanding our contemporary post-9/11, global, late modern, social condition. (shrink)

In The Borderline Culture: Intensity, Jouissance, and Death, Željka Matijašević examines contemporary culture through psychological borderline theory.

We exhibit a 10-element semigroup Q such that the question “Does a given quasi-identity hold inQ?” is co-NP-complete while the question “Does a given identity hold inQ?” can be answered in linear time.

The purpose of this paper is to outline some recent progress in descriptive inner model theory, a branch of set theory which studies descriptive set theoretic and inner model theoretic objects using tools from both areas. There are several interlaced problems that lie on the border of these two areas of set theory, but one that has been rather central for almost two decades is the conjecture known as the Mouse Set Conjecture. One particular motivation for resolving MSC is that (...) it provides grounds for solving the inner model problem which dates back to 1960s. There have been some new partial results on MSC and the methods used to prove the new instances suggest a general program for solving the full conjecture. It is then our goal to communicate the ideas of this program to the community at large. (shrink)

Building on the work of Schimmerling [Coherent sequences and threads, Adv. Math.216 89–117] and Steel [PFA implies AD L, J. Symbolic Logic70 1255–1296], we show that the failure of square principle at a singular strong limit cardinal implies that there is a nontame mouse. The proof presented is the first inductive step beyond L of the core model induction that is aimed at getting a model of ADℝ + "Θ is regular" from the failure of square at a singular strong (...) limit cardinal or PFA. (shrink)

Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...) his philosophical program of logic-as-an-universal-language. This is why Frege places his project in line with Leibniz’ philosophical project of finding a lingua characterica universalis. (shrink)

Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...) his philosophical program of logic-as-an-universal-language. This is why Frege places his project in line with Leibniz’ philosophical project of finding a lingua characterica universalis. (shrink)

Frege’s famous definition of number famously uses the concept of “extension”. Extensions, in the Fregean framework, are susceptible to bringing many difficulties, and, some say, even paradoxes. Therefore, neo-logicist programs want to avoid the problems and to replace the classical Fregean definition of number with Hume’s Principle. I argue that this move, even if it makes sense from a computational point of view, is at odds with Frege’s larger philosophical project. For Frege, I claim, extensions were an important part of (...) his philosophical program of logic-as-an-universal-language. This is why Frege places his project in line with Leibniz’ philosophical project of finding a lingua characterica universalis. (shrink)

This article focuses on the Russian image of Heidegger as a thinker of Being, as a conservative critic of late modernity, and as a “post” philosopher. On the one hand, special interest in Heidegger...

I analyze in this article the different ways in which Descartes uses abstraction in the Regulæ, discussing his project of a mathematical physics, the role of the imagination, and the status of numbers. I also try to show that the doctrine of simple natures cannot be well accommodated with the theory of abstraction developed in Rule 14, having instead a greater affinity with Descartes’ later theory of abstraction and exclusion, in which imagination plays no role and everything happens at a (...) strictly intellectual level. This interpretation is supported by the recent discovery of the Cambridge manuscript, which almost certainly records an early stage of composition and in which the doctrine of simple natures is absent, thus being very probably a later development. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl was responsible for setting in motion one of the two main philosophical currents which swept Europe in the first half of this century. In this book the author tries to explain how Husserl developed his phenomenology from his early 'psychologistic' analysis of number (which brought him into conflict with Frege) to the transcendental phenomenological analysis of his 'mature period'. The author has also discussed briefly the views of some other prominent phenomenologists. The phenomenological method has been applied in (...) different contexts and with different results and the author has tried to give an illustration of this and also to point out some basic limitations of the phenomenological approach. (shrink)

This paper introduces a persistence puzzle involving two sports clubs with a somewhat intertwined history. As one might assume, the implications of the puzzle go far beyond a mere plea for a precise metaphysical analysis of certain perplexing quandaries regarding sports clubs and represents a challenge for our everyday understanding of social groups. To overcome the supposed impediment to the puzzle, as a starting point, I will accept the assumption that these entities are both social groups and abstract artifacts and (...) will further argue that they are _temporal abstract objects_. Since temporal objects are in time, it will be determined that the cause of the conundrum is the seeming inability to correctly account for the I-relation between the temporal parts, and I will elaborate on why such an explanation is required. Ultimately, I’ll introduce the notion of _I-shifting_, which will explain how temporal abstract objects persist through time and consequently solve the puzzle. (shrink)

This article provides a brief systemic analysis of the key concepts of the so-called new science of art developed by the Austrian art historian Hans Sedlmayr. The result of Seldmayr’s pursuits are reflected in creation of his own philosophy of art and culture based on a particular worldview. The cognition of the whole, along with individual and unique, underlies this science. Understanding is the goal of scientific knowledge for Sedlmayr. It suggests not only abstract knowledge, but peculiar existential experience as (...) well. Sedlmayr interprets the understanding of artwork as its contemplation, which in turn, is identical to its actualization or presence. In Seldlmayr’s art of science, epistemologies and ontologies merge into each other. He interprets artworks simultaneously as the event and as the social organism, which overcomes the linearity of time and fragmentation of plurality. This artificial complex system, built on the paradoxical identity of the single and plenty, is both finite and infinite. Sedlmayr’s views encompass classical and nonclassical approach towards cognition of the whole. He relies on the principles of monism, seeking to reduce all concepts to a single basis, single point of singularity that designates the synthesis of all the moments of the whole and can be expressed by a single category. The main category, which resembles the center of the opposites, is the “midpoint”. The aforementioned ideas are consistent and logical only in such scientific worldview that identifies ontology and epistemology, which implies the unity of contemplation and phenomenon of the artwork. Therefore, in Sedlmayr's constructions, actualization or revival of the artwork is identical with its comprehension. The systemic approach towards the artwork reflected in the theoretical works of Sedlmayr extends the boundaries of art science and converges with philosophy. (shrink)

We show that assuming the determinacy of all games on reals, every set of reals is \ universally baire.